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Prior to 2007, in order to encourage international investment, China operated two parallel 
financial reporting systems, one based on Chinese GAAP for domestic investors and the other 
based on IFRS for international investors. In 2007 after a series of reforms to harmonise 
Chinese GAAP with IFRS, this system was replaced by a single set of standards for both 
classes of investor. We evaluate the impact of this significant change on earnings quality for 
stocks quoted on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period 2003-2013. 
Using tests of earnings smoothing and early loss recognition, we identify three key features. 
Firstly, earnings quality improved consistently over the period. Secondly, prior to the reforms 
of 2007, IFRS earnings were of superior quality to Chinese GAAP earnings. A third and 
important finding is that earnings quality under Chinese GAAP after the 2007 reforms is 
comparable to that under pre-2007 IFRS. 
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The impact of the 2007 reforms in 
China on the quality of earnings 
 
1. Introduction 
As part of its transition to a market oriented economy, China introduced a number of 
accounting reforms. Initially, there was a dual reporting system. International 
investors received financial reports based on IFRS whilst reports to domestic 
investors used Chinese GAAP, a less demanding set of standards, although also still 
based on Western reporting practices. In 2007, there was an important change. 
Chinese GAAP was significantly upgraded to reflect IFRS and this set of standards 
was mandatory for reporting to both domestic and international investors. 
The impact of these 2007 reforms is relatively under researched, particularly the 
actual effect on earnings quality, rather than the beliefs of investors about it. In this 
paper, we investigate the consequences of the reforms by investigating earnings 
quality of companies quoted on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the 
period 2003-2013. We focus on earnings smoothing and timely loss recognition, two 
key features of earnings quality. Our results show clearly that overall earnings quality 
improved steadily throughout the period, although prior to 2007 IFRS earnings were 
superior to those based on Chinese GAAP. However, companies appear to have 
responded well to the 2007 reforms such that the quality of Chinese GAAP earnings is 
now similar to that of pre-2007 IFRS earnings. 
Our paper is structured as follows. First there are sections explaining, in more detail,  
the background to the study and the contribution of the paper. Then follows sections 
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on our methodology and sample selection. We conclude with an analysis of the 
results, some additional tests and a summary of our findings. 
 
2. Background and prior literature 
2.1 Early harmonisation reforms prior to 2007 
One of the first harmonisation reforms was Enterprise Basic Accounting Standards 
introduced in 1993 along with changes in the national accounting law to commence 
the harmonisation process towards accounting standards adopted in the developed 
world. Subsequent reforms, with a view to harmonisation with IFRS, were Accounting 
System for Joint Stock Limited Enterprises in 1998 and Accounting System for 
Business Enterprises in 2001. These changes were accompanied by significant 
amendments to the corporate ownership structure, corporate governance and market 
infrastructure. Chinese listed companies were able to issue several classes of share: A 
shares, for domestic investors, although only about one third of these could be traded; 
B shares for international investors; and H (N) shares for those companies also quoted 
on the Hong Kong (New York) stock market. Moreover, different classes of 
shareholder received different financial statements. Investors holding A shares 
received statements prepared in accordance with Chinese domestic standards (Chinese 
GAAP), whilst investors holding B shares received statements prepared under IFRS 
(Wu, Li, Lin, 2014). 
These changes in accounting regulation towards harmonisation with IFRS are 
examined in a number of studies. The evidence concerning China’s progress towards 
developed world accounting standards is somewhat fragmentary, but overall there 
seems to have been some initial caution over IFRS earnings since Eccher and Healy 
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(2000) and Hu (2002) found that Chinese GAAP earnings are more strongly 
associated with stock prices. However, this scepticism about IFRS seems misplaced 
since Eccher and Healy (2000) also find that Chinese GAAP earnings are no better 
than IFRS earnings at predicting future cash flow. Subsequent studies suggest that the 
stock market became more accustomed to working with IFRS since later studies such 
as Sami and Zhou (2004) and Liu and Liu (2007) find that IFRS earnings are more 
informative of stock prices than Chinese GAAP earnings.  
Other studies focus on more specific issues. Corporate governance structures do not 
seem to have influenced the harmonisation of Chinese GAAP to IFRS (Chen and 
Cheng 2007), although shareholders tend to pay a price premium where corporate 
governance is effective (Bai, Liu, Lu, Song and Zhang 2003). There is some evidence 
that audit quality reduces earnings management (Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang 2010). 
Liu, Saidi, and Bazaz (2014) report that companies with significant state control have 
poorer quality earnings. 
The impact of the early reforms in progressing China towards developed economy 
accounting practices is difficult to gauge because each of the studies uses a pooled 
sample with no time dimension. In addition, the sample periods covered by the studies 
are overlapping and therefore it is difficult to obtain any precise idea of progress. A 
second complication is the comparisons which some of the studies make between 
Chinese GAAP and IFRS earnings of Chinese companies. It is difficult to interpret 
these comparisons since the international standards used are only a partial reflection 
of the IFRS practices implemented in the West (Deloitte, 2005). Consequently, at this 
stage, perhaps IFRS earnings number is not an appropriate benchmark to assess 
Chinese GAAP earnings. A third reason for caution is that a number of studies do not 
evaluate the quality of earnings directly, but use stock prices as a proxy. They 
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measure how much weight stock prices give to earnings. The assumption here is that 
the market is rational and well informed, which in a transition economy may not be 
the case. 
2.2 The 2007 IFRS convergence reforms  
In 2006, the Chinese Ministry of Finance announced the convergence of Chinese 
accounting standards with IFRS by issuing a revised version of Accounting Standards 
for Business Enterprises. It specified that from 1 January 2007, the standards were to 
be mandatory for all companies listed on Chinese stock exchanges; and significantly, 
financial statements for both class A and class B shareholders were to be prepared 
under the revised Chinese GAAP (Wu, Li, Lin, 2014). This was an important and bold 
step in China’s transition, bringing companies with domestic investors in to line with 
those companies already accustomed to reporting to its international investors through 
standards based on IFRS.  
Given the significance of this convergence to IFRS for all companies, a number of 
studies have tried to assess its impact on the quality of reported earnings. Qu, Fong 
and Oliver (2012) report that for A shares, stock prices in 2008-10 period give greater 
weight to earnings than in the 2004-6 period. This suggests that at least the stock 
market had increased confidence in the convergence to IFRS. However, some 
reservations are relevant. As mentioned above, the method is only indirect evidence 
that the reforms improved earnings quality since the method captures the beliefs of 
the market, which may not always be based on economic reality. In addition, the 
study also finds a counter-intuitive result that book value has a negative influence on 
stock prices in the 2008-2010 period. 
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The study by Wu, Li and Lin (2014) also adopts a market based approach, but has 
some surprising results. The weight given to current earnings in the valuation of 
stocks in the 2007-9 period is significant, but not any larger than the weight given to 
either Chinese GAAP or IFRS earnings in the pre-harmonisation period 1994-97.  In 
addition, earnings seem to be given no weight in the harmonisation period (1998-
2005), in contrast to other studies such as Hu (2002) and Sami and Zhou (2004). A 
main contention of the research is that the timeliness of earnings has worsened. They 
find that, uniquely in the IFRS convergence period 2007-2009, stock returns are 
related to earnings in the following period. This suggests that information which is 
reflected in stock prices in one period is not reflected in earnings until the following 
period. This means that earnings are slow at capturing information which is relevant 
for stock prices. However, the finding may simply be a sign of increased stock market 
efficiency. It is a common finding that prices in a well-functioning stock market 
reflect future information (Weiss, Naik, and Tsai 2008), and perhaps this aspect of the 
Chinese markets improved in IFRS convergence period. 
 A direct test of earnings quality is reported in a study by Kao (2014) which estimates 
earnings management over the 2002-9 period. It reports results for the pooled sample, 
and therefore its results cannot indicate what changes have occurred between the pre 
and post convergence periods. An analysis of the impact of the reforms on earnings 
quality is given by Liu, Yao, Hu, and Liu (2011). They compare the 2007-8 post 
reform period with 2005-6. They report an improvement in earnings quality in that the 
smoothness of earnings decreased. However, they report no significance tests of 
whether this is due to less smoothing activity or to a greater volatility of the 
underlying cash flows. They also report, using the Basu (1997) test of timely loss 
recognition, that there was no early recognition of future losses in either period. 
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However, this may not be an appropriate test in a developing economy. The test 
compares earnings with stock returns; the underlying intuition is that whilst returns 
capture both future profits and losses, the conservatism principle means that earnings 
captures only future losses. Thus there should be a closer link between earnings and 
stock prices when both are anticipating future losses. A weakness of the test, 
particularly for our purposes, is that it assumes that the existence of future losses is 
adequately proxied by negative current stock returns. However, in a transition-
economy stock market, prices may not adequately reflect information about the 
future. Furthermore, the assumption may be problematic even in a well developed 
market. Negative returns are not caused only by expected future losses, and losses are 
not always associated with prior negative returns. 
 
3. Contribution of the study 
3.1 A recent sample 
Changes in financial regulation may need some time to be reflected in company 
practice. Therefore the short run consequences may be very different from those in the 
medium term. In this respect it is important to have up to date evidence, particularly 
when prior work indicates that the policy change has improved practice only 
marginally at best; smoothing behaviour appears to have improved only slightly and 
the timely loss recognition is reported to be actually poorer. 
The studies which examine the market weighting given to earnings are Qu, Fong, and 
Oliver (2012) who study 309 companies for 2008-10 and Wu, Li, and Lin (2014) 
analyse only 84 companies over the 2007-9 period. As mentioned above, this 
evidence is somewhat imperfect since it is a view through the eyes of market prices. 
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The study which is closest to ours is Liu, Yao, Hu and Liu (2011) which reports direct 
tests of earnings quality. They cover 870 companies during 2007-8. Our tests cover 
the period 2003-2013, and therefore extend the post reform period time frame 
significantly to 2007-2013, whilst covering a comparable number (744) of companies. 
3.2 Direct tests of earnings quality 
The 2007 reforms of accounting and reporting regulation were a major step in 
aligning China’s economy with the developed nations. The reforms promulgated a 
single set of standards for all companies, whether they have international investors or 
not. How Chinese companies have faced up to this challenge has received attention in 
only a few studies. Furthermore, the assessments are largely indirect, through the 
weight placed on earnings in the valuation of stocks. As we argue above, this 
approach places too much emphasis on the market’s evaluation at a time when its own 
infrastructure (such as the expertise and understanding of market analysts) is also 
undergoing significant change. In view of this possibility, our tests are a direct test of 
the quality of earnings. These are discussed next.  
3.3 Smoothness tests 
The smoothing of earnings is an important objective for companies trying to show 
their performance in a favourable light. But the drawback for investors is that 
smoothing hides company risk. Therefore, the lack of smoothness is a key component 
of earnings quality, particularly since it contextualises any earnings management by 
capturing the impact on the level of earnings. A weakness of the smoothing tests 
conducted in Liu, Yao, Hu, and Liu (2011) is that they are incomplete. They show 
(their Table 2) that the smoothness of earnings significantly decreased in the post 
reform period. However, in their significance tests, they do not benchmark the 
volatility of earnings against the underlying volatility of cash flows; more volatile 
10 
 
earnings may be due to less smoothing activity or a greater volatility of the underlying 
cash flows. We conduct the same smoothing tests, but perform significance tests with 
a bootstrap procedure. 
3.4 Timely recognition of bad news 
An important aspect of earnings quality is its conservatism, in alerting investors to 
potential liabilities and bad news in the future. Both Liu, Yao, Hu, and Liu (2011) and 
Wu, Li, and Lin (2014) report a lack of timeliness in earnings. Both studies use stock 
returns as the benchmark, which are assumed to adequately reflect future cash 
performance. Liu, Yao, Hu, and Liu (2011) find that in the post-reform period in 
contrast to the prior period, some information which is impounded in stock prices is 
not captured by earnings until the next period. However, as mentioned above, this is a 
well established property of stock prices in developed economies (see for example 
Kothari and Sloan 1992, and Weiss, Naik, and Tsai, 2008); the explanation for the 
finding may be the increased efficiency of the market, rather than a decline in the 
timeliness of earnings. Wu, Li, and Lin (2014) find that, in the post-reform period, 
bad news tends not to be anticipated by earnings. However, as mentioned above, the 
test which they use assumes that negative stock returns adequately capture future bad 
news, an assumption which is questionable even in fully perfectly efficient stock 
market. Therefore, we conduct a direct test of timely recognition of economic losses 
devised by Ball and Shivakumar (2005), based on the speed with which earnings 
bounce back after a decline in earnings; the faster that earnings bounce back the more 




4.1 The conditional conservatisms of earnings 
Our first earnings quality measure is conditional conservatism, which is a time series 
measure of earnings conservatism. We perform this test across sample period of 2003-
2013, in order to examine the changes in conservatism over time. To measure 
conditional conservatism, we adopt the model outlined in Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), which are widely used in various research papers such as Givoly, Hayn and 
Katz (2010), and Hope Thomas and Vyas (2013). The model is as follows. 
𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 ×  𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                    (1) 
 
where: 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is the change in income from year 𝑡 − 1 to t, scaled by total assets; 
𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is negative; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the control 
variable to control for size differences between firms, which is the natural logarithm 
of total assets; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the interactive control variables to control for 
industry differences; 𝑖  takes values from 1, …, 𝑛𝑡 ; and 𝑡  takes values from 2003, 
2004, …, 2013. The intuition underlying the test is that negative changes in earnings 
revert quicker than positive changes because bad news is more fully recognized in 
income; this means that economic losses are recognised in a timelier manner than 
gains. Therefore, 𝛼3 is expected to be negative.  
4.2 The smoothness of earnings 
Our second measure of accounting quality is a general one, capturing the smoothing 
of earnings and is based on Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2003) and Barth, Landsman 
and Lang (2008) who compare the quality of reporting across IAS and non-IAS 
regimes. The smoothness of earnings is a firm- specific time series concept. However, 
there are drawbacks to measuring smoothness at the firm level, primarily the selection 
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bias arising from the need to obtain a sufficient number of observations and the 
implied stability of the coefficients over time. Instead our approach is to include a 
time dimension by examining the change in earnings, which is then set in the context 
of other companies in a cross section, controlling for extraneous variables following 
Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2003) and Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008). It is also 
used in the study of the 2007 reforms of Chinese financial reporting by Liu, Yao, Hu 
and Liu (2011). 
The first step to test for the smoothness of earnings is to mitigate the effect of the 
economic factors which may influence smoothness of earnings by regressing the 
change in earnings scaled by total assets on a number of control variables. The 
variance of the residuals from this regression [𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)] is then used as an estimate of 
the smoothness of earnings. A smaller 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)  is an indication of earnings 
smoothness. Specifically, we run the following regression for each group to examine 
earnings smoothness.  
𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼6𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡                                                                (2) 
 
where: 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡  is the change in earnings scaled by total assets; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is the natural 
logarithm of end of year value of equity; 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  is the proportionate change in 
sales; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book 
value; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage change in total liabilities; 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is sales divided 
by end of year total assets; and 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the cash flow from operating activities divided 
by end of year total assets; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the interactive control variables 
to control for industry differences.  𝑖 takes values from 1, …, 𝑛𝑡; and 𝑡 takes values 
from 2003, 2004, …, 2013.  
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A weakness of 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼) is the way in which it controls for the economic factors which 
may affect the smoothness of earnings. Although the variables are firm specific, the 
coefficients of the model are estimated across the entire sample. This procedure is 
therefore unlikely to eliminate all of the firm specific economic components of 
smoothness which operate at the firm level; consequently, the regression residual is 
likely to contain both firm specific economic as well as accounting factors which 
affect smoothness.  
Our test for smoothness attempts to mitigate this confounding of economic and 
accounting factors, and is again based on Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2003) and Barth 
Landsman and Lang (2008). We compare the smoothness of the change in earnings, 
𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼) from equation (2), with the smoothness of the change in cash flow from 
operations, which is estimated in a similar way to the smoothness of earnings 
equation, but with 𝛥𝐶𝐹 as the dependent variable, as follows. 
𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛼6𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡                                                                  (3) 
 
where: 𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the change in cash flows from operations scaled by total assets. We 
obtain the variance of residual from equation 4, [𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹)], as the smoothness of cash 
flows from operation. The term 𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹), like 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼), will contain the firm specific 
economic components of cash flow smoothness since the parameter values are 
estimated across the sample; however, 𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹) is less likely to contain accounting 
components of earnings smoothing
1
. Taking the ratio of 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹) attempts to 
scale out the firm specific economic components of earnings smoothing leaving those 
                                                 
1
However, to the extent that the control variables are inadequately measured by the accounting system, 
𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹) may also contain accounting factors. 
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that relate to accounting methods. A smaller ratio is an indication of earnings 
smoothness. 
Equation (2) and (3) are used to test the earnings smoothness over time period of 
2003-2013. In order to compare the differences in earnings variability between each 
year as well as each type of firms, following Barth et al (2008), we estimate the 
standard error of the ratio, 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹) by a bootstrap procedure as follows. 
From the original sample, we randomly select (with replacement) a new sample of the 
same size, and estimate equations 2 and 3 again to obtain 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹); this 
procedure is repeated 1000 times to obtain the estimated sampling distribution and 
hence the standard error. The mean and standard deviation of each distribution are 
reported in the tables
2
 for comparison. 
 
5. Sample and Data 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between financial reporting 
standards and earnings quality under Chinese accounting systems, and to further 
analyse the changes of earnings quality in relation to changes in accounting standards 
over the period of 2003-2013, which includes the major reforms in Chinese 
accounting systems.  
We matched the databases of Datastream and Thomson Reuters based on accounting 
information and obtained observations that have available accounting and market data 
between 2003 and 2013. The sample consists of all Chinese-listed firms that issue A- 
and B- shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We 
exclude companies with qualified accounts during the observation period, because 
                                                 
2
 We also report the statistics for 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼) which are constructed in a similar way. 
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firms with qualified accounts are likely to be different from typical observation in 
terms of financial measures and reporting incentives. A total of 744 sample firms that 
are examined are from different industries as shown in Table 1. The resulting sample 
includes 8,184 firm-year observations from different industries
3
. We observe that 
almost half of firms are from manufacturing industry. 
--------------- 
Table 1 here 
--------------- 
 
6. Analysis of results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 gives the summary statistics of the accounting variables used in the study, 
which reflect the main variables used to construct our earnings quality measure. As 
the variables based on measure of earnings quality are sensitive to outliers, all non-
dummy variables are winsorized at 5% level following Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
and Barth et al. (2008). We observe that, changes in earnings and changes in cash 
flows are more varied after the year of 2007. Although these two variables are not 
controlled for other factors, they suggest that firms after 2007 are unlikely to have a 
higher level of earnings smoothness. Chinese listed firms have high leverage, 
indicating that they have a greater reliance on debt to fund or finance the business. In 
addition, sales and total debts issued for Chinese firms have been increasing over 
time. Next, we analyse our multivariate regression test results. 
--------------- 
Table 2 here 
                                                 
3
 We also need prior year data (2002-2013) to calculate changes in earnings and lagged total assets, but this is 




6.2 Conditional conservatism of earnings 
Table 3 presents the results on conservatism from estimating the equation (1) across 
individual year from 2003-2013. Our predictions concerning conditional conservatism 
are based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005), that economic losses receive timelier 
recognition than gains, that we expect 𝛼3 to be negative. Overall Chinese listed firms 
present a conservative nature as 𝛼3  is negative across all years, suggesting that 
Chinese listed firms do recognise the losses in a timely manner. The level of 
conservatism appears to vary during the pre-reform period, in that 𝛼3  is highest 
(0.230) in 2003, becomes non-significant in 2005 and rises again (-0.189) in 2006. 
Such variations in conservatism perhaps reflect the uneven application of Chinese 
GAAP during the period. However, the level of conservatism has increased 
systematically during the post reform period, from -0.283 in 2008 to -0.378 in 2013, 
indicating that earnings quality has improved after the convergence of Chinese GAAP 
with IFRS. 
--------------- 
Table 3 here 
--------------- 
6.3 The smoothness of earnings 
Table 4 presents the smoothness of earnings test for each individual year, for the 
sample period 2003-2013. According to Lang et al (2006) and Barth et al (2008), a 
smaller variance of residual [𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)] and a smaller ratio [𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹)] are an 
indication of earnings smoothness. For the 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼) measure, the level of smoothness 
is lower during pre-reform period than that in post reform period, suggesting that 
firms smoothed their earnings more during the pre-reform period. Furthermore, the 
level of smoothness fluctuates before 2007, with 2005 having the lowest 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼). 
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After mitigating for firm specific factors by taking the ratio of earnings variability to 
cash flows variability, 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹), the results show much the same picture. In 
particular, the ratio values for 2012 and 2013 (0.6725 and 0.7747 respectively) are 
much larger than in the pre-reform period. Therefore, the results for the smoothness of 
earnings across different sample years yield similar findings to the conservatism test; 
firms smooth their earnings less during the post reform period than in the pre-reform 
period. 
--------------- 
Table 4 here 
--------------- 
 
7. Additional Analyses 
We find above that earnings quality has varied during the pre-reform period. This 
could be due to the differential accounting standards applied by different classes of 
company. Before the reform of accounting standards in 2007, financial statements for 
investors holding A shares were prepared in accordance with Chinese GAAP, whilst 
for those holding B shares were prepared under IFRS (Wu et al 2014). In order to 
further analyse the impacts of accounting standards on earnings quality, we perform 
our conservatism and smoothing tests distinguishing between firms which follow 
IFRS and Chinese GAAP during the sample period.  
7.1 The conditional conservatisms of earnings 
We estimate equation (4), which is modified based on equation (1) to allow 
differences between Chinese GAAP firms and IFRS firm. We test the incremental 
differential persistence between IFRS firms and GAAP firms by including additional 
dummy variable 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡, which takes the value 1 for IFRS firms and 0 for GAAP 
18 
 
firms. The modified regression that allows differences between IFRS and GAAP 
firms is estimated as follows: 
𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 ×  𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 × 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡
× 𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 ×  𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
                                (4) 
 
where 𝐷𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for IFRS firms and 0 for 
GAAP firms, and other variables are as defined above. We expect that economic 
losses receive timelier recognition than gains, and if firms follow IFRS, they are more 
likely to recognize economic losses in a timely fashion than firms which follow 
Chinese GAAP; hence, the coefficient (𝛼7) on IFRS firms is expected to be negative. 
--------------- 
Table 5 here 
--------------- 
The result of this test is presented in Table 5. It shows that firms do recognise the 
losses in a timelier manner across all the three sample periods in that the 𝛼3 
coefficient is significantly negative throughout. It becomes more negative in the post-
reform period (-0.389) compared to the pre-reform period (-0.201), which is 
consistent with our previous conservatism tests on individual years. The effect of 
IFRS during the pre-reform period can be seen in the value of 𝛼7 which is negative (-
0.195) suggesting that the earnings for firms following IFRS are more conservative 
than firms following Chinese GAAP. In contrast, the value of 𝛼7 is not significant in 
the post-reform period, suggesting that the level of conservatism for firms following 
Chinese GAAP is similar to those following IFRS
4
. The 2007 reforms appear to have 
                                                 
4 Strictly, no company should be following IFRS in the post-reform period; all companies should be following 




been successful in raising Chinese GAAP to an IFRS level. This indication is 
corroborated by the fact that 𝛼3 + 𝛼7 in the pre-reform period [(-0.201)+(-0.195)] is 
very similar to the level of 𝛼3 in post-reform period (-0.389), implying that the level 
of conservatism for GAAP-firms in post-reform period is similar to the level of 
conservatism of IFRS-firms in the pre-reform period. Overall, the level of 
conservatism for Chinese listed firms appears to have improved since the convergence 
of Chinese GAAP to IFRS in 2007. 
7.2 The smoothness of earnings 
We re-ran equations (2) and (3) after dividing the sample into firms which follow 
IFRS and Chinese GAAP during pre and post-reform periods to further examine the 
difference in earnings quality for IFRS and Chinese GAAP firms. The differences in 
earnings quality are examined by bootstrapping the variance of residuals to obtain 
empirical distributions, and the standard errors for each empirical distribution are used 
for comparison. 
--------------- 
Table 6 here 
--------------- 
The results of these tests are tabulated in Table 6. Firms which follow Chinese GAAP 
appear to have more earnings smoothing, that is lower 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼) and 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹), 
in the pre-reform period compared to the post-reform period; for example, 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/
𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹)  is 0.5882 in the pre-reform period compared with 0.6939 in the post-reform 
period. These differences are statistically significant, and suggest that earnings quality 
for firms following Chinese GAAP has significantly improved after the 2007 
accounting reform. Furthermore, the Chinese GAAP firms in the post-reform period 
have similar level of smoothness to IFRS firms in the pre-reform period. The 




𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹) measure is 0.6939 in the post-reform period for Chinese GAAP 
firms and 0.6825 for IFRS firms in the pre-reform period. This suggests that earnings 
quality under local standards converged with IFRS, which is consistent with the 
previous loss recognition tests in Table 5. 
In contrast, the firms which follow IFRS in the post-reform period appear to have 
smoother earnings than in the pre-reform period; for example, 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹) is 
0.5970 in the post-reform period, but 0.6825 in the prior period. This may be due to 
the small number of firm-year observations. However, following 2007, firms are 
supposed to follow Chinese GAAP which is converged with IFRS; therefore the lower 
values of 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)  and 𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹)  may be an indication of firms managing 
earnings for a specific purpose.  
 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
Prior to 2007, in order to encourage international investment, China operated two 
parallel financial reporting systems, one based on Chinese GAAP for domestic 
investors and the other based on IFRS for international investors. In 2006, China 
issued revised accounting standards to converge with IFRS, and all companies listed 
on Chinese stock exchanges were required to prepare financial statements under the 
revised Chinese GAAP, which is effective from 1 January 2007. The convergence of 
Chinese GAAP and IFRS has been studied by relatively few papers. Moreover, even 
fewer conduct direct tests of accounting quality; instead they evaluate the quality of 
earnings using stock prices as a proxy benchmark, with the assumption that the 




The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of 2007 accounting reform on 
earnings quality. We measure earnings quality by earnings smoothness and timely 
loss recognition, which are two direct tests on earnings quality. Earnings smoothness 
contextualises any earnings management by capturing its impact on the level of 
earnings, while timely loss recognition tests the speed with which earnings bounce 
back after a decline in earnings; the quicker earnings bounces back, the more likely it 
is that declines in future performance have been anticipated and impounded in current 
earnings. 
We first explore the changes in earnings quality for Chinese listed firms over time, 
and our results indicate that the accounting quality for Chinese listed firms has 
improved over the 2003-2013 period. We analyse the differences in earnings quality 
for firms following Chinese GAAP and IFRS in both pre and post-reform periods. We 
find that prior to the reforms of 2007, IFRS earnings were of superior quality to 
Chinese GAAP earnings. We also find that the 2007 reforms have improved earnings 
quality and that Chinese GAAP is now comparable to pre-2007 IFRS. 
This paper highlights the issue of convergence of Chinese GAAP with IFRS on 
earnings quality. Generally, our evidence suggests that the earnings quality for 
Chinese listed firms has improved over time and the convergence of Chinese GAAP 
with IFRS has also resulted in improved earnings quality. The findings of this paper 
shed light on developments in accounting standards and highlight the benefits brought 
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Table 1: Sample distribution across industries 
Industry breakdown 
Industry Number of firms % 
Mining 30 4.0% 
Construction 98 13.2% 
Manufacturing 361 48.5% 
Transportation & Public Utilities 91 12.2% 
Wholesale Trade 63 8.5% 
Retail Trade 45 6.0% 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 24 3.2% 
Services 31 4.2% 
Public Administration 1 0.1% 
Total 744 100% 
   







Table 2. Summary Statistics relating to variables used in analyses  
 
Overall 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Mean (median) [standard deviation] 
∆NIi,t 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.018 0.017 0.059 -0.042 0.001 0.028 0.029 -0.026 0.004 
 
(-0.001) (-0.000) (-0.001) (-0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (-0.017) (0.002) (0.004) (-0.004) (-0.005) (0.000) 
 
[0.393] [0.113] [0.104] [0.088] [0.104] [0.329] [0.345] [0.303] [0.375] [0.656] [0.710] [0.628] 
             
D∆NIi,t 0.358 0.509 0.392 0.407 0.493 0.295 0.219 0.579 0.365 0.297 0.443 0.485 
 
(0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
[0.479] [0.500] [0.489] [0.492] [0.500] [0.456] [0.414] [0.494] [0.482] [0.457] [0.497] [0.500] 
             
DIFRSi,t 0.076 0.119 0.122 0.125 0.123 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.027 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
[0.265] [0.325] [0.328] [0.331] [0.329] [0.173] [0.169] [0.169] [0.173] [0.169] [0.173] [0.162] 
             
Sizei,t 21.510 21.190 21.280 21.310 21.350 21.520 21.570 21.700 21.850 22.000 22.150 22.310 
 
(21.380) (21.100) (21.160) (21.230) (21.320) (21.470) (21.500) (21.670) (21.800) (21.920) (22.020) (22.160) 
 
[1.465] [1.113] [1.193] [1.265] [1.390] [1.507] [1.545] [1.616] [1.668] [1.672] [1.653] [1.594] 
             
Growthi,t 0.115 0.156 0.187 0.034 0.062 0.190 0.053 0.001 0.198 0.171 0.098 0.135 
 
(0.109) (0.158) (0.176) (0.102) (0.104) (0.161) (0.073) (0.017) (0.193) (0.136) (0.048) (0.073) 
 






Table 2. Summary Statistics relating to variables used in analyses - Continued 
 
Overall 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Mean (median) [standard deviation] 
Levi,t 2.374 1.585 1.867 2.128 1.468 3.254 2.144 2.992 2.750 1.997 2.451 3.474 
 
(1.215) (1.118) (1.196) (1.304) (1.313) (1.257) (1.300) (1.323) (1.377) (1.354) (1.482) (1.523) 
 
[7.140] [9.601] [12.020] [10.520] [24.750] [28.240] [5.342] [20.980] [26.013] [5.089] [6.370] [13.250] 
             
Dissuei,t 0.123 0.157 0.129 0.094 0.072 0.159 0.050 0.118 0.143 0.134 0.150 0.137 
 
(0.089) (0.129) (0.092) (0.072) (0.064) (0.108) (0.043) (0.096) (0.133) (0.089) (0.083) (0.082) 
 
[0.515] [0.400] [0.378] [0.331] [0.499] [0.569] [0.529] [0.542] [0.490] [0.719] [0.678] [0.518] 
             
Turni,t 0.647 0.577 0.635 0.664 0.743 0.714 0.720 0.638 0.690 0.727 0.679 0.663 
 
(0.497) (0.444) (0.493) (0.522) (0.534) (0.560) (0.567) (0.502) (0.543) (0.559) (0.502) (0.512) 
 
[0.713] [0.521] [0.556] [0.612] [1.471] [0.729] [0.712] [0.590] [0.663] [0.733] [0.691] [0.688] 
             
CFi,t 0.046 0.041 0.055 0.050 0.023 0.048 0.118 0.048 0.016 0.012 0.033 0.027 
 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.054) (0.050) (0.052) (0.046) (0.041) (0.046) (0.039) (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) 
 
[0.724] [0.090] [0.098] [0.091] [0.924] [0.148] [2.307] [0.171] [0.455] [0.184] [0.096] [0.184] 
             
∆CFi,t -0.077 -0.004 0.020 -0.002 0.016 0.107 0.179 -1.141 0.130 -0.332 -0.035 0.093 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (-0.000) (0.007) (-0.001) (-0.009) (0.013) (0.002) 
 
[9.413] [0.148] [0.132] [0.114] [0.185] [1.588] [5.576] [31.970] [3.465] [8.098] [2.560] [1.584] 
Note: Results reported in this table used a sample of 8,184 firm-year observations. 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the change in earnings from year 𝑡 − 1 to t, scaled by total assets; 𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if 𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1is negative; 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the change in earnings scaled by total assets; Sizei,t is the natural logarithm of end of year value of equity; 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the proportionate change in 
sales; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage change in total liabilities; 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is sales divided by end of year total assets; 




Table 3. Conditional Conservatism for all firm-years after controlling for size and industry effects 
𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 ×  𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 

















 -0.003 -0.008 0.026
**
 0.006 -0.007 -0.013
**
 -0.005 -0.008 
 (-3.43) (-2.73) (-1.92) (-0.73) (-1.10) (2.19) (0.88) (-0.85) (-2.04) (-0.97) (-1.40) 



















 (-0.96) (-2.00) (-3.49) (-0.89) (-2.13) (-7.19) (-2.42) (-5.74) (-2.90) (-4.60) (-4.31) 




























 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.004
**
 -0.001 









(-1.80) (-3.15) (-1.54) (-0.94) (0.87) (-0.34) (0.08) (-0.77) (0.69) (2.56) (0.27) 
 
           
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R
2
 27.50% 8.19% 11.80% 9.00% 6.77% 26.30% 19.50% 26.40% 20.30% 36.70% 22.60% 
Number of Obs. 730 733 733 738 740 741 742 742 742 742 742 
Note: Results reported in this table used a sample of 8,184 firm-year observations. 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the change in earnings from year 𝑡 − 1 to t, scaled by total assets; 𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if 𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1is negative; 𝑖 takes values from 1, …, 𝑛𝑡; and 𝑡 takes values from 2003, 2004, …, 2013; 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the interactive 
control variables to control for industry differences. The variables are winsorized at 5% level.  










Table 4. Earnings Smoothness for all firm-years 
Models employed to estimate earnings smoothness: 
𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
Comparison of firms’ Change in Accounting Quality across time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 























Variability of ∆NI 0.0040 0.0033 0.0023 0.0039 0.0046 0.0047 0.0050 0.0053 0.0052 0.0055 0.0055 

























over ∆CF 0.5577 0.5244 0.3098 0.5895 0.5852 0.4510 0.5146 0.5816 0.5772 0.6725 0.7747 























Number of Obs. 730 736 738 736 733 731 734 731 733 734 741 
Note: Results reported in this table used a sample of 8,184 firm-year observations. 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the change in earnings scaled by total assets; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the natural logarithm of end of year value of 
equity; 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage change in sales; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage change in total liabilities; 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is sales divided by end of year total assets; and 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total assets; 𝑖 takes values from 1, …, 𝑛𝑡; and 𝑡 takes values from 
2003, 2004, …, 2013. The variables are winsorized at 5% level. 
𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹) is the ratio of variability of earnings to the variability of cash flows from operating activities, where the variability of earnings is measured by the variance of the residuals 
from equation 2 and the variability of cash flows is measured by the variance of the residuals from equation 3. This ratio is to capture the smoothness of earnings related to the smoothness of 
cash flows. We report the means and standard deviations of the bootstrapped variance of residuals [𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)] and the ratio [𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹)]. 
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Table 5. Conditional Conservatism for firms follow Chinese GAAP and IFRS after 
controlling for size and industry effects 
𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑫𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟑𝑫𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ×  𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟒𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟓𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊,𝒕 ×
𝑫𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟔𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊,𝒕 × 𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟕𝑫𝑰𝑭𝑹𝑺𝒊,𝒕 × 𝑫𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ×  𝜟𝑵𝑰𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟖𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +
𝜶𝟗𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕  
 







     





  (-3.04)  (-4.52) 





  (-6.77)  (-16.36) 





  (-10.92)  (-7.02) 
DIFRSi,t (α4)  0.008
**
  0.002 
  (2.55)  (0.15) 
DIFRSi,t ×D∆NIi,t-1 (α5)  -0.015
***
  0.014 
  (-2.84)  (0.76) 
DIFRSi,t × ∆NIi,t-1 (α6)  -0.034
*
  0.352 
  (-1.80)  (1.38) 
DIFRSi,t  × D∆NIi,t-1 ×∆NIi,t-1(α7)  -0.195
**
  0.436 
  (-1.96)  (0.84) 
Sizei,t (α8)  -0.000  -0.001 
  (-0.43)  (-0.71) 
Intercept (α0)  0.007  0.033 
  (0.28)  (1.10) 
Chi-Square: α3 (1) =  α3 (2)  7.68*** 
Chi-Square: α3 + α7 (1) =  α3 + α7 (2)  0.61 
Industry dummies  YES  YES 
Adjusted R
2
  9.13%  19.2% 
Number of Obs.  2934  2968 
Note: Results reported in this used a sample of 8,184 firm-year observations. 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the change in 
income from year 𝑡 − 1 to t, scaled by total assets; 𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
𝐷𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 is negative; 𝑖 takes values from 1, …, 𝑛𝑡 ; and 𝑡takes values from 2003, 2004, …, 2013; 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is the interactive control variables to control for industry differences. The 
variables are winsorized at 5% level.  











Table 6. Earnings Smoothness for all firm-years for firms follow Chinese GAAP and IFRS 
Models employed to estimate earnings smoothness: 
𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝛥𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
Comparison of firms’ Change in Accounting Quality across time and accounting standings 















Variability of ∆NI  0.0040 
 
0.0068  0.0043  0.0012 
Mean, SD of Bootstrap Distribution  0.0043, 6.73E-06  0.0070, 1.12E-04  0.0040, 3.47E-04  0.0013, 1.25E-04 
Variability of ∆NI
 
over ∆CF  0.5882 
 
0.6939  0.6825  0.5970 
Mean, SD of Bootstrap Distribution  0.5883, 0.0012  0.6937, 0.0034  0.6827, 0.0039  0.5972, 0.0071 
Number of Obs.  3870 
 
4982  523  155 
Note: Results reported in this table used a sample of 8,184 firm-year observations. 𝛥𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the change in earnings scaled by total assets; 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of 
end of year value of equity; 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage change in sales; 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the 
percentage change in total liabilities; 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is sales divided by end of year total assets; and 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total assets; 
𝑖 takes values from 1, …, 𝑛𝑡; and 𝑡 takes values from 2003, 2004, …, 2013. The variables are winsorized at 5% level. 
𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹) is the ratio of variability of earnings to the variability of cash flows from operating activities, where the variability of earnings is measured by the variance 
of the residuals from equation 2 and the variability of cash flows is measured by the variance of the residuals from equation 3. This ratio is to capture the smoothness of 
earnings related to the smoothness of cash flows. We report the means and standard deviations of the bootstrapped variance of residuals [𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)] and the ratio [𝑉(𝛥𝑁𝐼)/
𝑉(𝛥𝐶𝐹)]. 
 
